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Abstract

Since the rise of neoliberalism in the world in the last quarter of the 20th century, many former
state socialist economies also started their transition into different kinds of market economic
models. Over the course of the last three decades or so, there emerged distinct paths of transition
among these economies. This paper proposes a Marxian framework to help understand the three
major models of transitions among former socialist economies: the Russian path, the Chinese
path, and the Cuban/North Korean path. The framework focuses on the differences in workingclass composition and in particular the size of the potential reserve army in these socialist
economies. An examination of the historical process of market reforms in former state socialist
economies suggests that a sizable potential reserve army could give rise to a gradual approach to
neoliberal transition while a negligible potential reserve army could lead to either a shock
therapy or a long impasse.
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Since the rise of neoliberalism in the world in the last quarter of the 20th century, many former
state socialist economies also started their transition into different kinds of market economic
models. Over the course of the last three decades or so, there emerged distinct paths of transition
among these economies. There were huge differences in the policies as well as outcomes
between Russia and China. At the same time, it is easy to notice that countries like North Korea
and to a less extent Cuba seem to continue following a more traditional state socialist economic
model without a major change in their social relations of production.
What explains such wide divergences among these economies? Scholars have long pointed out
the profound impact of different ideologies and transition strategies (shock therapy vs gradualism
among others) in Russia and China (see the discussions in Burawoy 1996, Kotz 2005, Whyte
2009, Weber 2020). These factors played a crucial role in each country’s historical path, but
these ideas and decisions were themselves the result of concrete social, political, and economic
relations, and need to be explained.
Interestingly, Jeffery Sachs, the then influential advocate for shock therapy, was among the first
to spell out the political economy of neoliberal transitions. In an effort to defend shock therapy,
Sachs and Woo (1994) and Sachs (1995) argued it was China’s agricultural dominated economic
structure that proved to be “so felicitous to reform”. And Sachs defended the necessity of shock
therapy and argued the high level of industrialization and social welfare in the eastern European
and former Soviet Union made gradual transition impossible.
Sachs’ somewhat optimistic prediction about the Russian economy in his papers has not aged
well, but is he correct after all about the political economy of reform strategies? This paper
proposes a Marxian framework to help understand the divergence in transitions among former
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socialist economies. The framework focuses on the differences in working-class composition and
in particular the size of the potential reserve army in these socialist economies.
Some brief historical and theoretical contexts below may help illustrate the relevance of
(potential) reserve army. The concept generally refers to those people who are unemployed or
semi-unemployed in capitalism, as against the active labor army. It serves as one of the vital
support mechanisms of capitalism is, as Marx (1967, p. 592) points out that it is "the lever of
capitalistic accumulation, nay, a condition of existence of the capitalist mode of production."
Working as a reservoir, the reserve army "during the periods of stagnation and average
prosperity, weighs down the active labor-army; during the periods of over-production and
paroxysm, it holds its pretensions in check."
In cases where reserve army shrank too much (below a certain "natural" level), capitalism often
ran into crises (Pollin 1998). Following the Great Depression, the regulated capitalism guided by
Keynesianism brought a period of the low unemployment rate and economic prosperity in
advanced capitalist economies. With other forces, this in turn contributed at least partly to the
rising labor militancy/cost, as well as the crisis of the 1970s (Amstrong et al 1991; Kotz 2015, p.
63-67). Following the crisis, the capitalist class started to shift away from the regulated model.
The rise of neoliberalism, on the macro level, necessarily involved the task of defeating the
working class and rebuilding a pro-capital regime by privatization and deregulation (Glyn 2006).
However, these offensives against workers in these developed economies, in general, would not
have worked well without a global momentum of anti-labor reforms. This was particularly the
case in the rise of the now dominant multinational firms, which longed to be free of national
regulations, and desperately needed a global workforce and the corresponding labor reservoir. It
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should be noted that even before the crisis in the 1970s, the forces that eventually brought about
neoliberalism started to consolidate on the reserve army issue. Stephen Hymer, a leading scholar
on the multinational corporations, already saw the prospect of "internationalization of capital" in
the early 1970s. According to Hymer (1972), "The unlimited supply of labor in Europe is drying
up as they exhaust their own populations and the possibilities for importing cheap labor", and
"Firms from all these countries are looking more and more toward labor in outlying fields."
Hymer (1972) also pointed out that the potential surplus labor was in Eastern Europe, China, as
well as the whole third world, as the cost remained low while potential productivity has
increased substantially "due to government expansion of education, urban and industrial
infrastructure, and other services."
Despite the clear potentials, the demand for a new reserve army would remain unmet without a
great transformation of the social relations in the potential sources of the labor force. The global
reserve army could not fall from the sky. It required a "structural adjustment" and a major shift in
policies away from the progressive and socialist-inspired goals in many third world countries
after their independence. What this boils down to, is that a good number of workers in the world
had to lose their jobs, and they did. In other words, the creation of a local/national reserve army
was the prerequisite of the creation of a global reserve army.
Historically, the reforms in state socialist economies like China and the former Soviet Union
played a major role in this process. These economies had nearly full employment, and they did
not need and did not have a reserve army of labor. The later reforms essentially separated labor
from means of production and created a functioning reserve army. The way this played out in
each country, of course, could and did vary greatly across borders. This article argues that the
key variable here was the size of the potential reserve army, that is, sections of the working class
4

which could be transformed into reserve army easily. The analysis argues that despite the largely
similar motivations among the elites and the early reform policies, the actual historical path was
significantly shaped by the relative size of the potential reserve army in each economy and the
corresponding class politics. An examination of the historical process of market reforms in
former state socialist economies suggests that a sizable potential reserve army could give rise to
a gradual approach to neoliberal transition while a negligible potential reserve army precluded
such gradualist possibilities.
The next section will discuss the origins of the potential reserve army in former socialist
economies. We then present the history of transitions in both the Soviet Union and China to
illustrate how the potential reserve army made an impact on the neoliberal transitions in both
countries. The fourth section explores the more general implications of the analysis and applies it
to countries such as Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba. The last section concludes the paper.

The potential reserve army in the Soviet Union and China

Early Marxian writings, such as the Communist Manifesto, sometimes envisioned a future
revolutionary scenario when the society is increasingly divided into a large industrial proletariat
and a small group of capitalists. Although in terms of the general trend, the claim is certainly
valid, but the reality then was much more complex. Marx and Engels during their lifetime
already seriously acknowledged the co-existence of capitalist and pre-capitalist social relations in
a large part of the world. In his letter to Zasulich in 1881, Marx (2010) mentioned under certain
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conditions, the rural communes in Russia may become "the fulcrum for social regeneration".
Engels (1990) writing about the German peasantry in 1894, commented that the peasantry
remained an important factor in Western Europe except in Britain proper and Prussia east of the
Elbe.
At the same time, the epicenter of the revolution kept moving to the East, the less developed
region. In 1848, Marx and Engels saw Germany being the new frontier of the revolution
following Britain and France. While by the turn of the 20th century, Kautsky and Lenin both
anticipated Russia as the new center (Lenin 1966, p. 22). The fact that a sizable peasantry may
still exist by the eve of revolution posed important political and theoretical questions. These
questions already concerned German social democrats in the 1890s, and it became even more so
for the Russian communists in the 20th century. As the revolution did not succeed in the more
developed part of Europe, Lenin and his comrades faced an unprecedented challenge of building
socialism in a country with a relatively low level of capitalist development.
These historical conditions paved the way for a sometimes painful process of industrialization.
But despite the many difficulties, the first socialist country made dramatic achievements. In
terms of net material product, the Soviet Union grew five-fold between 1928 and 1940 and
already become a major industrial power by the start of the Second World War (Kotz and Weir
2007, p.34-6). After defeating the Nazis with huge sacrifices, the Soviet Union still maintained a
steady rate of economic growth. Between 1946 and 1985 when the Soviet Union started its
market reforms, Soviet Union's real per capita GDP in 2011 US dollars grew about 3.2 percent
per year, about 50 percent higher than either the United States or the United Kingdom. 2
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The long sustained growth in the Soviet Union created a predominantly urban society and a large
domestic working class. Between 1917 and 1982, the share of the country's urban population
increased from 18 percent to 64 percent (Yanitsky 1986). The urban population increased by
142.6 million, and most of this increase came from rural to urban migrants (Yanitsky 1986). In
the early 1970s, the share of employment in the industry was 47 percent in the Soviet Union, in
between the USA (37 percent) and England (55 percent) (Livshits 1974). In 1989, near the end of
the Soviet era, the industry share of employment was about 57 percent, while 18 percent worked
in agriculture and 25 percent worked in service (US Bureau of Census 1991).
If the Soviet Union represented the more advanced end of the socialist spectrum, China probably
would sit on the other end. Building its revolution from the countryside, the Chinese communists
won a country with a largely rural population that has suffered from a century of colonial and
imperialist invasions and oppressions. Mao and his comrades faced much harsher conditions in
developing socialism compared to their Soviet counterparts.
Like other socialist economies, China's economic growth under state socialism was also
remarkable. The real per capita GDP in constant 2011 US dollars grew at 3 percent annually
between 1950 and 1980. 3 But perhaps partly due to the relatively lower starting point, by 1980
China remained a predominantly agrarian economy. In 1949 when the People's Republic was
founded, the share of urban population was 10 percent, and it increased to 19 percent in 1980 on
the eve of market reforms (State Statistical Bureau (SSB) 2010). In 1980, 69 percent of the
employment was in agriculture, 18 percent was in the industry and the remaining 13 percent was
in service (SSB 2010).
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It is not unreasonable to speculate that given sufficient time, China would move closer to where
the Soviet Union was in terms of economic development and industrialization. At the historical
juncture of the 1980s, however, there were qualitative differences between the working class
compositions in the two countries, which had profound implications regarding the question of the
potential reserve army.
China's economy was much more segmented in that urban workers enjoyed much higher income
and better access to culture, healthcare than their rural counterparts. An average urban resident
earned 150 percent more than the income of a rural resident in 1980 (Xu 2018, p. 77). For China
as a whole, the income distribution was highly egalitarian, but the inequality between rural and
urban communities was stark. China's Gini coefficient, according to one estimate, was just 0.31
in 1980, and more than 50 percent of the inequality was due to rural-urban income differences
(Chen et al 2010).
This rural-urban, or peasant-worker alliance in the Soviet Union seemed much more solid.
According to Alexeev and Gaddy (1993), the Gini coefficient of income in the Soviet Union was
lower than 0.3 throughout the 1980s. More importantly, the rural-urban inequality was not that
large. In 1988, for example, the per capita income of households of Kolkhoz members (rural
collectives) in the Russian Federation was only 14 percent less than that of state employees
(Flakierski 1992). In the richer Baltic republics, the rural collectives provided an even higher
income than the state (Flakierski 1992).
The rural-urban divide in China partly followed from the peasant question from the 19th-century
revolutions. The weak link in global capitalism provided a great starting point for revolution, as
Lenin and Mao illustrated well by their pens and guns. But it also implied that for an extended
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length of time, the working class would likely be divided into two unequal segments. It was no
longer the case for the Soviet Union but was still prevalent in China in the 1980s.
It is worth keeping in mind that (urban) workers in both the Soviet Union and China had strong
interests to stay in the state-owned enterprises/socialist economy. The socialist economy in the
Soviet Union and China provided the urban workers stable jobs, free or very affordable housing,
education, and healthcare, none of which would be provided by the private economy. The
advantage of the socialist system to the workers was clear in many other ways. In 1988, an
average industry worker in the Soviet Union worked 34.9 hours per week, while the
nonagricultural wage workers in the US worked 39.1 hours per week, and the self-employed
worked 41 hours per week (US Bureau of Census 1991). In 1987, the average age upon receipt
of social security benefits in the US was 63.6 (male) and 63.3 (female), while the age in the
Soviet Union was 58.5 (male) and 54.6 (female) (US Bureau of Census 1991). Given the high
degree of industrialization and urbanization, and the little difference between urban and rural
incomes, the Soviet public in general had not much interest in neoliberal economic reforms, as
Kotz and Weir (2007, p.132-3) showed.
The significance of China's large and poor rural population was that rather than a more unified
interest of the Soviet working class, the Chinese working class was divided by the rural-urban
line and tended to have two different voices/answers to the market reforms. The massive rural
working-class (commune members/peasants) in China enjoyed fewer benefits from socialism and
were more inclined to embrace the market reforms and join the non-socialist sector. In this sense,
the rural economy was the weak link of socialism in China and the rural working class could be
relatively easily turned into a large reserve army for China's new market economy.
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To global capitalism, most labors in the East and South were part of a potential reserve army.
While to each country's capitalists or wannabe-capitalists, the weak link of the working class
constituted their national potential reserve army. Such weak link did not explicitly exist in the
Soviet Union, while it was still visible in China. Sachs (1995) argued that while China’s iron rice
bowl (job tenure, adequate income and benefits) covered less than 20 percent of population, the
Soviet Union and eastern European countries had a universal iron rice bowl. Thus the soviet
economy gave rise to a much more extensive “sense of entitlement” among their large working
class than among the Chinese counterparts, and the neoliberal reforms were viewed with “so
little enthusiasm” among both workers and farmers in the Soviet Union (Sachs and Woo 1994).
Thus the neoliberal transition had a somewhat friendlier situation in China than in the Soviet
Union based on the different levels of socialist development. As mentioned above, the huge labor
force in China and the Soviet Union can only become a capitalist labor force with a significant
structural change. This change can take different forms, however, depending on the size of the
potential reserve army and its political economy in each country, which we will turn to in the
next section.

The paths of transition in the Soviet Union and China

The state socialist regimes in the Soviet Union, China, and other similar countries in the 20th
century often had the following features: the political power concentrated in the party-state elites,
while the economic output was relatively equally shared among the elites and the working class.
One of the contradictions was that the people in power were often unsatisfied with the system,
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unlike what capitalists often feel about capitalism. Although the party-state elites enjoyed certain
privileges in this regime, they had much lower income and much more uncertain careers
compared to their peers in capitalist economies (Kotz and Weir 2007, p. 106-7). Mao Zedong
famously called these elites as capitalist roaders and the pro-capitalist political coalition was
already in formation during Mao's time (Li 2008, p. 55-61; Xu 2018). The material incentives of
these elites to bring in capitalist social relations were strong. And despite the many differences
between the Soviet Union and China, the motivations of starting these neoliberal transitions were
certainly similar in both countries.
As Marx (1979) said, "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they
do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly
encountered, given and transmitted from the past." Since there was widespread support for
socialism in China and the Soviet Union throughout the reform period, and the workers already
had some key formal and informal power in the system such as life-long jobs and access to
affordable housing, education, and healthcare, the pro-capitalist elites had to be careful and
resourceful. The whole reform was a continuous and intense political struggle, and the Soviet
Union and China only diverged in the middle.
The Soviet Union and China started its first phase of economic reform by virtually the same
strategy (Sachs 1995). It was granting more autonomy to public-owned enterprises which meant
that the enterprises would have more freedom in what to produce, where to sell and how to
allocate the profits (Kotz and Weir 2007, pp. 76; Qi 2018). The policymakers may have hoped
that the imitation of un-coordinated capitalist enterprises would gradually replace the central
planning economy with a genuine market economy. The naivety aside, the political aim of such
reform programs was more than clear. The leadership was trying to get support for more market
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reform by pleasing the working class (and others). The workers still kept their tenured jobs and
all the benefits, which meant the state kept the massive social spending. Moreover, the more
autonomous enterprises tended to allocate more wages and bonuses to the workers since the
workers retained their job tenures and other informal power. And the enterprises and the
managers can also get a larger share at the same time.
This political strategy, however, suffered from fundamental contradictions. First of all, this
reform, by keeping workers intact, could not build a functioning reserve army and thus the
capitalist market economy. And subsequently, the seemingly pro-worker allocation meant the
state received less income (while keeping the social spending) and the enterprises spent less on
investment, which led to increasing fiscal deficit and less capital accumulation and output growth
(Kotz and Weir 2007, pp. 76-77; Qi 2018).
Not surprisingly, the early reforms soon produced chaos and crisis. During the Soviet crisis
phase of 1988-1989, the consumer goods market saw growing shortages, the government fiscal
revenue declined, and capital accumulation slowed down dramatically (Kotz and Weir 2007,
p.77-80). A similar crisis happened repeatedly in China, first in the early 1980s (Xu 2018, p.7072), and then throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Qi 2018). These failures in essence proved
it impossible to have a smooth and peaceful neoliberal transition, at least in the industrial sector
of the former socialist economies.
The early phase of the reform might have facilitated further market reform in two ways. First, the
workers had a short term gain in their income, which solidified their support for more market
reforms. Second, the later crisis, despite caused by the market reform, further challenged the
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legitimacy of state socialism and increased the appeal of a more radical neoliberal transition
(Kotz and Weir 2007, p.80).
Since the more benevolent approach had failed, the Soviet party-state elites then seized the crisis
momentum and chose to use the "shock therapy" to defeat the whole Soviet working class once
and for all. The living standards of the working class deteriorated rapidly and the means of
production quickly concentrated in the former elites' hands (Kotz and Weir 2007, p.214-221).
This was a wise move for them since such an opportunity may not arise again as we shall see in
other countries' examples in the next section. It was, however, definitely a most devastating way
of transition for the Soviet people who had built an alternative society through generations of
sacrifices and struggles.
The Chinese elites, on the other hand, were not in the same dead-end yet. Despite the failed
urban reforms, they have yet to touch the vast rural working class. The Chinese elites then
basically paused the urban reform and spent the early years of the 1980s on rural reforms. In
1984, the Chinese government dismantled the rural communes and divided the collective land to
each rural household, which was made possible only by coercive commands, intensive political
campaigns, and generous agricultural subsidy (Hinton 1990, Xu 2018).
The commune system, although had remarkable achievements, had its own weaknesses and
problems (Xu 2018). Chinese agricultural production at the time was still largely manual labor
based, so the collective work could still be easily individualized such as dividing the plot to each
household. It would be indeed impossible to divide the machines into pieces for each worker.
And more importantly, given the huge rural-urban divide, an insecure and low pay employment
opportunity in the new private business in the urban areas could be quite attractive.
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The Chinese rural communes used to keep the rural workers fully occupied throughout the year
by collective projects such as infrastructure building. Patnaik and Natrajan (2000) summarized
different estimates and concluded that the average annual workdays per worker more than
doubled under the communes from a little more than 100 days to about 250 days. With the
communes in the past, there suddenly emerged a large number of "surplus labor" (Patnaik and
Natrajan 2000, Qi and Li 2019). It became even worse later with a more explicit capitalist
transformation of Chinese agriculture and the emergence of a large rural proletariat (Xu 2017).
These surplus laborers became the basis for the migrant workers and the new reserve army. They
worked in the newly developed private and semi-private firms in urban areas. And many, if not
most of such private-sector jobs are in the informal economy without a living wage and labor
protection (Xu et al, 2015; Chen and Xu 2017). An estimate in the 1990s suggested the number
of workers released from the agricultural sector by then was easily more than 100 million
(Rawski and Mead 1998). The recent national survey in 2019 reported a massive 290 million
migrant workers in China. 4
With the "success" of the rural reforms, a booming private economy outside the socialist sector,
and a new large reserve army, the Chinese elites then finally moved on to tackle the remaining
question of the urban working class in the late 1990s. It was already more than 10 years after the
rural reform. Technically speaking, China had its own shock therapy not that different from the
Soviet Union's, but the shock therapy took place within an already developed market economy,
thus did not cause society-wide chaos. That, however, did not make the urban neoliberal
transition any less brutal. Between 1995 and 2002, the privatization and market reform led to 45
million lay-offs in the state and collective owned enterprises (Giles et al 2005). These job losses
4
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were permanent. In 1995, the state and collective owned enterprises together employed 144
million workers, and in 2018, the remaining such enterprises only employed about 61 million
workers. 5
Where the Soviet Union had to confront the whole working class, China was able to divide and
conquer, utilizing the large potential reserve army in the countryside. The difference was
probably less about how the elites had different goals but were rather due to the different sets of
conditions that they had to work with.

Three models of the historical transition
The neoliberal transitions everywhere have been at the expense of the working people, but the
way the transition took place could be quite different as we have shown above. Historically,
three distinct paths evolved during such transitions in the former socialist economies.
The first is the Russian path, which featured a more developed socialist economy and a higher
level of industrialization and urbanization. The history of the Soviet Union suggests that only a
complete overhaul can destroy the resistance to the neoliberal transition and create a functioning
capitalist market economy. The second is the Chinese path, which arose from a less developed
socialist economy and a large rural population and a significant rural-urban divide. The Chinese
history shows that, under such conditions, the elites had more space to build allies for market
reforms and could potentially finish the neoliberal transition without disrupting the entire
economy and fighting the whole working class together. Within the socialist bloc, much of
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Eastern Europe had a fairly high level of industrialization and followed the Russian path, while
the more agrarian Vietnam followed the Chinese path.
There is a third path that largely maintained the traditional state socialist model while kept
experimenting with market reforms. There are clear tensions between the two directions and the
forces behind those, but it has not reached any political conclusions since the demise of the
Soviet Union. Both North Korea and Cuba would fall into this impasse category and it is useful
to closely examine the two countries.
The two countries, despite other obvious differences, share some important common features.
Most importantly, both had relatively developed economies with a large share of the urban
working class. Despite later severe challenges, the North Korean economy before the demise of
the Soviet Union was fairly successful. In 1975, North Korea's per capita GDP already reached
2057 in 2011 US dollars, a level that China first surpassed in 1995, and India in 2008. 6 Like the
Soviet Union, North Korea also had a high level of industrialization and urbanization. An
estimate suggests that North Korea's industry share of employment in 1987 was 57 percent,
which was the highest among all the socialist countries in that period (Noland 1997). The
agriculture share of employment was just 25 percent in 1987 (Noland 1997); as a reference,
China in 2018 still had 26 percent of employment in agriculture. 7 The Cuban economy was in an
even better position. In 1985, Cuba's per capita GDP reached 7455 in 2011 US dollars, and
China only surpassed that record in 2007. Cuba also has a fairly urbanized society even before
the revolution. In 1950, the urban population was 49 percent, which increased to 74 percent by
1997 (Ebanks 1998). In 1970, 87.5 percent of the economic active population were state workers
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(Veltmeyer and Rushton 2011, p. 63). Before the recent major reduction of state payrolls, in
2009, 83.8 percent of employment was in the state sector; even after the reform in 2010, the state
employment share was still 75 percent in 2012 (González-Corzo and Justo 2014).
The highly urbanized/industrialized economy and its lack of a clear potential reserve army likely
presented a similar challenge to the pro-market elites in both countries. It also implies that a
gradual approach like the Chinese path to reform is not feasible. The potential of following the
Russian path, however, was also limited by their other two similar conditions.
First, the domestic pro-market elites missed the key opportunity. In both the Soviet Union and
China, the first generation revolutionary leaders (Lenin and Mao) passed away before these
countries embarked on their reforms. The second or third-generation leadership was often more
careerist than communist. On the contrary, both North Korea and Cuba's first-generation
revolutionary leaders (Castro and Kim) were still in power by the demise of the Soviet Union. It
could still be possible, but rarely communist leaders like them would change their ideology and
embrace neoliberal reforms. Even after they passed away, the Russian path's disastrous
consequences for sure dampened the popular appeal of whatever market reform plans in other
countries. Once North Korea and Cuba missed the critical historical juncture, it would be hard to
build the momentum for nationwide shock therapy.
Second, the returns from such reform are somewhat uncertain for the elites in North Korea and
Cuba. The new Russian capitalists were mostly old Soviet elites. But this is unlikely to be the
case for North Korean elites, as unification will inevitably happen following the shock therapy
and the South Korean big capital will be much better equipped to take over the remains of North
Korea. Similarly, the Cuban exiles, backed by the US, would likely claim a large share in the
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nation's assets once Cuba takes the Russian path. The US aggression against both countries only
strengthens such uncertainty, and decreases the willingness of undertaking the highly risky
Russian path.
All these factors have seemingly left North Korea and Cuba at an impasse as of now. The
sanctions and other hardships may gradually create a space for the private economy and a new
reserve army, which could become the basis for further market reforms. But without a major
external shock, it is possible to see the current model lasting a relatively long time.

Conclusion
Institutional changes are likely to first happen in places with weaker support for the status quo.
This thesis of "weak link" applies to revolutions as well as counter-revolutions. The multiple
oppressions from both imperialist powers and domestic feudal lords and their allies made it hard
for the national bourgeoisie to build a successful revolution in the underdeveloped regions. That
provided the historical space for the communist-led revolutions in the 20th century. With all the
great achievements, the contradictions of these state socialist societies created internal dynamics
towards later neoliberal transitions. Having to defeat the working class and transform them into
the proletariat, the pro-market elites tried and eventually chose different paths in different
countries. This article argues that these different paths were based on the size of the potential
reserve army and other related historical conditions, rather than different motivations or
traditions.
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The temporary success of capitalists has brought great catastrophe to global working people. On
the other hand, the failures of many former state socialist societies also provided invaluable
lessons and experiences for Marxists. Moreover, capitalists constantly create their own
gravediggers, and the capitalists' aggressions in the last several decades have probably created
more diggers than ever before. In countries like China, the urban working class has expanded
greatly. It is not unreasonable to expect that the future revolutionaries will not need to worry as
much about the rural-urban divide and the potential reserve army. New contradictions and
problems, of course, will still be there, but socialists might eventually be able to struggle at a
higher level of human civilization. Socialism is dead, long live socialism.
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